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FROM DENATIONALISATION TO 
WHOLESALE BROADBAND ACCESS: 
A RETROSPECTIVE OF REGULATORY 
POLICIES IN THE UK FOR THE 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Advait Deshpande* and Allan Jones**
Abstract
Th is paper examines the shift ing regulatory policies in the United Kingdom (UK) 
across three market segments, telecommunications, radio/television and cable, 
starting with British Telecom’s (BT’s) denationalisation in 1984. For the period 
examined, this paper focuses on following key events –
– Th e phased liberalisation of the UK communications industry starting with the 
BT-Mercury Communications duopoly in 1984
– Th e allocation of cable franchises as regional monopolies in the mid-1980s 
– Introduction of satellite broadcasting and the infl uence of British Sky 
Broadcasting (BSkyB) Corp. on broadcasting services in the 1990s
– Th e emergence of the Internet/Web and the subsequent development of a 
broadband policy from mid-1990s onwards
Drawing on Dodgson et al.’s concepts of Market logic, Coordination Logic, and 
Complex-Evolutionary Logic, the authors argue that the forms of regulation 
introduced shaped the ways the UK communications industry developed. Th us 
although the denationalisation grew out of a free market ideology, in practice the free 
market philosophy was tempered for a number of pragmatic reasons. Prominent 
among these was a need to create a competitive market in a context where competitors 
would be unlikely to emerge without regulatory intervention, and an emphasis on 
price competitiveness to ensure that the end-users benefi tted from the best possible
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prices on available products and services. Subsequent events show that these 
interventions had unintended consequences. Th e unforeseen popular demand for 
Internet/Web access found regulators struggling to fi nd ways to promote a competitive 
market, and incumbent operators struggling to fi nd a way to off er a suitable product.
Keywords: Coordination logic; Denationalisation of telecommunications; Market 
logic, UK regulatory policy
1. INTRODUCTION
Th is paper follows in roughly chronological order the main regulatory interventions 
relating to the UK communications industry in the approximately three-decade period 
from 1983. Th is period is especially rewarding to study because it encompasses the 
liberalisation of the telecommunications market, the convergence of telecommunications, 
cable and broadcasting, and the rapid growth of Internet connectivity and broadband. 
Th e liberalisation of the UK communications market diff ered signifi cantly in several 
respects from that of the USA and the liberalisation that followed elsewhere in Europe 
(see Perrucci and Cimatoribus, 1997 for a discussion on the diff erent regulatory policies 
in France, Germany, UK, and the USA). For these reasons, and others, this period and 
location of telecommunications history merits investigation.
Th e paper examines both the varying motivations of regulatory policy and the 
ways in which the regulatory framework developed across diff erent segments of the 
communications industry – telecommunications, cable, broadcasting, and wireless 
services.1 Th e following narrative combines material from original interviews2 with 
archival material, and other secondary sources to present a retrospective of the 
regulation in the United Kingdom (UK) communications industry.
1 Th e boundaries between these segments have not been clear-cut. Even when these market segments 
were monitored separately, the services they provided in terms of voice, data, and video overlapped 
signifi cantly as the following discussion will show.
2 Th e research interviews were conducted from December 2011 to May 2012 by one of the authors. 
Th e interview participants were enlisted by contacting a range of industry people identifi ed from 
the available literature and then actively following up on the references provided by the interview 
participants. Th e interviews were done either in person or via a telephone conference. For more 
details about the interview participants, please see the Appendix section.
 Although designed to follow a semi-structured format, the interviews were conducted with a fl exible 
approach. Th e outcome was that most of the interview participants ended up narrating an oral 
history of their experiences and perspectives on the developments in the UK communications 
industry for the period under discussion in this paper. In each case, the interview participants were 
provided a detailed summary of the discussion aft erwards and given an opportunity for feedback. 
Where possible, the testimonies provided by the interview participants have been corroborated with 
the literature available in the form of journal articles, archival material, and other published sources. 
Th e analysis presented in this paper derives from such summaries of the discussions, subsequent 
checks for accuracy, and any additional feedback, if received. Where anonymised, as in the case of “A 
senior Cable & Wireless employee”, the name has been withheld according to the participant’s wishes.
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1.1. DENATIONALISATION OF UK TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Th e denationalisation3 of the UK’s telecommunications industry in 1983 was the fi rst 
of a wave of utility-denationalisations begun during Margaret Th atcher’s second term 
as British Prime Minister, following her re-election in 1983.4 An overarching principle 
of these denationalisations was the introduction of competition into former state 
monopolies to increase effi  ciency and deliver the best prices to end-users. Each 
denationalised utility was to have its own independent regulatory body – independent, 
that is, of the utilities themselves, but having wide ranging powers to impose 
obligations on utilities in the interests of end-users and in the interests of competition. 
Th is paper contends that the interactions of the UK’s telecommunications industry 
and its regulators have profoundly aff ected the way the telecommunications industry 
has developed following denationalisation. Although the paper considers interactions 
between the major communications industries, the focus is on fi xed-line 
communications, that is telecommunications and cable operations.5
Regulation of telecommunications in the UK started in 1983 with the formation of 
the Offi  ce of Telecommunications (Oft el).6 Oft el was created with the primary purpose 
of overseeing the denationalisation of British Telecom, which was to be transitioned 
in stages from a public sector monopoly to, eventually, a completely privatised 
company (Oft el, 2003a). Also relevant to the story is the creation of the Cable Authority 
in 1984 to regulate what was intended to be a revitalised cable industry; and the 
creation of Ofcom in 2003 to regulate telecommunications, cable and terrestrial 
broadcasting. Th e authors contend that these various bodies and their policies were 
innovations, in so far as they enabled the state to maintain a signifi cant infl uence on 
the operation of the businesses while being offi  cially separate.
3 Although the sale of publicly owned assets is generally described as “denationalisation”, in the UK 
the term “privatisation” was used by the government. As Rutter et. al. (2012, p. 1) describe, the term 
privatisation “gained favour simply through the lack of a better alternative” and because 
denationalisation “did not sound positive enough”.
4 Th e policy of denationalisation adopted by the British Conservative party is attributed by various 
sources to the free market ideology espoused by Michael Beesley, Keith Joseph, and Stephen Littlechild. 
Each one of them played a key part into the policy instruments that were adopted in the end. Keith 
Joseph was the Secretary of State and Industry (from 1979 to 1981) in the Th atcher government and an 
ardent supporter of introducing competition as a way of improving the functioning of public-sector 
monopolies (Harrison, 1994). Michael Beesley was with the London Business School and advocated 
strong market-orientated reforms for a number of utilities and telecommunications (Foster, 1999). 
Stephen Littlechild was the chief architect of the price regulation policy (Meek, 2012).
5 Th is distinction between telecommunications and cable is mostly attributable to the legacy 
functions of these market segments. Whereas telecommunications was largely associated with 
telephony services, cable was associated with television broadcasting. An additional distinction is 
in the transmission technologies the operators in these market segments relied on. Telephony 
services were mostly delivered over copper-line Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Cable 
television was delivered over coaxial cable/hybrid fi bre coax network.
6 Prior to that the telecommunications was a public sector monopoly operated by the Post Offi  ce 
working as a UK government department. A separate regulatory body to oversee the Post Offi  ce 
functioning or the telecommunications industry did not exist.
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1.2. DODGSON ET AL.’S WORK ON INNOVATION POLICY – 
MARKET LOGIC, COORDINATION LOGIC, AND COMPLEX-
EVOLUTIONARY LOGIC
For a theoretical interpretation of the events covered by this paper, the authors draw 
on the theoretical insights into the innovation policy in Dodgson et al. (2011). Before 
explaining Dodgson et al.’s analytical framework, however, it is useful to elaborate on 
what makes Dodgson et al.’s work so appropriate to the present study of regulation in 
the UK communications industry.
Dodgson et al. are concerned with national policies towards innovation in a market 
context. However, whereas much thinking on innovation concentrates on successful 
artefacts, services, or applications, such as the iPhone, the Google search engine, or 
Facebook, Dodgson et al. say (p. 1154) that innovation should not be seen exclusively 
in terms of science, technology and R&D (nor, indeed, in terms of success). Rather:
Innovation is an economic act that may rely not on new technology but on new 
perceptions of market opportunity. Innovation involves business experimentation…
Th is view accords with the position adopted by the authors of this paper, who see the 
liberalisation of the UK communications market as an innovation, but one of ‘new 
perceptions of market opportunity’ rather than new technology.
A second justifi cation for the use of Dodgson et al.’s work is their framing of 
innovation and markets in terms of system concepts, particularly those relating to the 
wider context of legislation and regulation:
Markets are necessarily incomplete arrangements and they are heavily infl uenced by 
a range of social, political and legal institutions. Markets are emergent: they facilitate 
the trading of new kinds of products and services and, although they can arise 
spontaneously, government support can help develop them and make them work 
eff ectively. [p.1153]
Th is invocation of wider system concepts is appropriate to the present study, where 
shift s in the communications market were infl uenced by multiple interacting factors, 
including the regulators’ changing conceptions of what the market should consist of.
A third justifi cation for the use of Dodgson et al.’s work is the close correspondence 
between its analytical concepts and process that were seen at work in the evolution of 
the telecommunications market as narrated below. Th us Dodgson et al.  argue (p. 
1146) that market failures are not merely anomalous deviations from ideal markets, 
but are inherent in the way dynamic, innovative markets operate. Th e narrative part 
of this paper (below) provides abundant examples of regulatory interventions to fi x 
‘market failures’ in the communications sector, and innovations that leave regulators 
and operators perplexed about the appropriate response.
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Having summarised why Dodgson et al’s framework for policy analysis is 
appropriate to the present study, it is necessary to explain the main elements of their 
framework before embarking on the narrative of communication evolution in the UK.
Dodgson et al.  distinguish between policies of Market logic and Coordination 
logic. Th ese policies approximate to a free market approach (‘Market logic’) and one of 
governmental intervention to fi x failures in the market (‘Coordination logic’). Dodgson 
et al (2011) clarify that the concepts of Market logic and Coordination logic themselves 
are derived from the works of Baumol (2002; et. al, 2007) and List (1827; 1838; 1841) 
respectively. Baumol (2002) focuses on oligopolistic markets and incremental 
innovation as a way of driving market growth. Baumol et. al. (2007), in turn, further 
focus on market-led disruptive innovation. Dodgson et. al’s assessment of Friedrich 
List is based on Freeman’s (1992) work. In their assessment, the focus of the economic 
policy advocated by Friedrich List is on long-term policy measures driven by active 
intervention in the economy.7 Aft er off ering caveats about the dangers of using simple 
schemes of categorisation in social sciences, Dodgson et al.  explain the policies of 
Market logic and Coordination logic with the aid of a diagram (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Dodgson et al.’s broad policy approaches to national innovation systems
An example of Market logic is the USA’s free-market approach to innovation, 
encapsulated in writings by William Baumol on Entrepreneurial Capitalism. But, as if 
to underline the dangers of too simple schemes, Dodgson et al. point out that the US 
7 According to List (1827; 1838; 1841), the role of the government and the policy makers is to facilitate 
social inclusive growth via promoting technological competitiveness. For a concise analysis of List’s 
idea of political economy of nationalism, see Levi-Faur (1997).
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government’s defence expenditure and support for early stage innovation in small 
fi rms are characteristic of a ‘Coordination logic’ approach (p. 1147), where intervention 
is used to create an outcome that Market logic by itself would not produce.
Coordination logic, by contrast with Market logic, involves state intervention, but 
this does not imply state control. Rather, Coordination logic is when governments 
have a coordinating role in relation to markets to encourage desirable outcomes. For 
example, a government might intervene to ensure technological competitiveness or 
social inclusion, or to prevent a single winner from taking all. Th us there is no essential 
confl ict between Coordination logic and a belief in markets as the best way to foster 
innovation. However, Coordination logic is premised on the idea that the free market, 
left  to its own devices, can produce undesirable outcomes, or ‘market failures’, for 
which remedial or preventative action in the form of intervention is required. Dodgson 
et al. cite as exemplars of policies of Coordination logic those of certain Scandinavian 
countries and developing Asian economies (p. 1147).
Th e intermediate trajectory in Figure 1, ‘Complex-Evolutionary logic’ is not 
associated with any country nor, in the view of the present authors, is it simply a 
compromise between Market logic and Coordination logic. Certainly it encompasses 
the necessity of entrepreneurialism for innovation, but sees innovation as unlikely to 
occur in the neoclassical economists’ ideal market. Th is is because the neoclassical 
model of perfect competition and rational choice hardly refl ects the reality of 
innovation, which is characterised rather by disequilibrium and radical uncertainty 
in decision making (p.1148). Th is indeterminate quality of innovation, according to 
Dodgson et al., is interpreted (or misinterpreted) as market failure in neoclassical 
economics. As mentioned earlier, Dodgson et al. argue (p. 1146) that market failures 
are inherent in the way dynamic, innovative markets operate, and need to be 
recognised as such by policy makers and innovators. Th e Complex-Evolutionary 
approach is associated with the writings of Joseph Schumpeter and evolutionary 
economists such as Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (for example, see Nelson and 
Winter, 1974; 1977).
Dodgson et. al (2011) defi ne their framework in relation to strategies for national 
innovation policy. Th is is a somewhat diff erent context from that of the present paper. 
Nevertheless, the present authors consider that the framework off ers useful insights 
into the regulatory approach to the communications industry in the UK, and in 
particular to three phases of innovation, which are now outlined. Th e fi rst phase was 
the privatisation of the nationalised telecommunications industry in the mid-1980s. 
Th e second phase was the attempt to revitalise the cable television industry, also in the 
mid-1980s. In both of these phases, regulatory policy relied on early interventions, 
which gave way to an increasingly non-interventionist approach starting in the late 
1990s. Th is is the period where the third innovation takes place: the unforeseen and 
rapidly growing popular demand for high-speed Internet/Web access. Th is period 
can be characterised as “disequilibrium and radical uncertainty in decision making” in 
Dodgson’s et al.’s terminology (p.1148), as the telecommunications industry and 
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regulatory bodies struggled to comprehend an unforeseen shift  in the nature of their 
market.
2. 1980s – STAGED LIBERALISATION OF UK 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Th e denationalisation of the UK telecommunications industry happened in stages, 
beginning in 1983 with an initial privatisation of British Telecom in which the UK 
government retained a substantial share in the company. Subsequently, during the 
early 1990s, the government divested itself of its shares in BT (the trading name used 
by British Telecom 1991 onwards). In the fi rst stage of telecommunications 
liberalisation, the UK government licensed a competitor to British Telecom. Th is was 
Mercury Communications (hereaft er “Mercury”), a newly created company owned by 
a consortium of Cable & Wireless, British Petroleum, and Barclays Mercantile Bank 
(Mercury Communications Press Offi  ce, 1992). Th e creation of Mercury ended the 
monopoly in telephony and data that British Telecom had enjoyed prior to its 
denationalisation.8
2.1. RESTRICTIONS ON BRITISH TELECOM
At this stage the focus of regulatory policy was principally on ensuring that British 
Telecom’s transition into the private sector was successful, while curtailing its 
dominant market position, and ensuring that competition between British Telecom 
and Mercury thrived (Carsberg, 1987). Infrastructure competition was part of this 
policy. Mercury had to build its own trunk (i.e. core) network capacity to a deadline, 
and for this it chose a ‘fi gure of 8’ network connecting the major cities of the UK (at an 
early stage these cities were Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Nottingham, Milton 
Keynes, London, and Bristol. See Mercury Communications Press Offi  ce, 1992). 
However Mercury, in part due to the cost of investment, had no equivalent to British 
Telecom’s junction (i.e. access) network, and largely relied on interconnect agreements 
with British Telecom for the ‘last-mile’ connectivity of telephone (and other) services.9 
British Telecom was required to provide Mercury with access to its local loop (Mercury 
Communications Press Offi  ce, 1992).
8 Th e British Telecom monopoly applied to all areas of the UK except Kingston-upon-Hull. When the 
various municipal telephone systems licensed under the Telegraph Act 1899 were gradually 
absorbed into the Post Offi  ce telephone department in the early 20th century, the Hull City Council 
chose to renew its licence in 1914 and remained the only municipally owned telephone corporation 
in the UK. Kingston-upon-Hull was thus the only area in the UK which was not served by BT, before 
and aft er its privatisation. See KCom (2011). Eff ectively, the creation of Mercury ended BT’s 
monopoly in all areas except Kingston-uponHull where BT had no footprint.
9 A senior C&W employee, Interview with the author. Milton Keynes, 21 December 2011.
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British Telecom was subject to further restrictions to prevent it from exploiting its 
dominant position in the market. Among these was price control over its retail and 
wholesale services, which is explored in later sections. Other restrictions were 
designed to limit it from expanding beyond telecommunications into new areas of 
communications business. In particular, it was prohibited from delivering broadcast 
services, such as television and on-demand services, on its main network (although 
on-demand services were permitted from 1993 onwards, and television services from 
1999. See BT, 1994; 2000). Th e intention here was not simply to prevent British Telecom 
from competing with broadcasters, but to prevent it from dominating the UK cable 
television industry, which was relatively undeveloped in the UK in comparison with 
many other countries, and which the government sought to promote. In summary, 
then, a range of ‘Coordination logic’ measures was put in place to ensure that the 
telecommunications market developed competitively, to curb the dominance of the 
newly privatised British Telecom, and to prevent British Telecom (subsequently BT) 
moving into other markets.
Cable franchises in the UK at this time (following a change of legislation by 
Margaret Th atcher’s government in 1984) were allocated by the cable industry’s 
regulator, the Cable Authority i.e. CA.10 Th e Cable Authority issued franchises not to 
national operators but as regional monopolies, with the intention of promoting 
investment in cable infrastructure. Th e regional monopoly status of cable operators 
was intended also to foster the creation of original regional television content, in a 
manner similar to that of the US-cable industry.11 Initially, cable franchise licences 
did not include telephony, although cable operators could choose to off er telephony on 
permission from the Director-General of Telecommunications.12
Th e Cable Authority (CA) not only oversaw the franchise allocation but also 
monitored the adherence to licence obligations of cable operators. Regulation of 
commercial television and radio in the UK was handled by separate regulatory 
authorities – the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and Radiocommunications 
Agency (RA) respectively.13 Although British Telecom was prevented from competing 
with cable operators through the embargo on its delivering broadcast content, it was 
allowed a limited presence in the cable industry through ownership. British Telecom 
10 Cable distribution systems for television and radio signals were in operation in the UK since about 
1951. Until the end of 1983, with the exception of a few pilot systems, all cabled distribution systems 
had been authorised to relay only British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Independent 
Broadcast Authority (IBA) broadcast programmes. With the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, the 
UK government not only established the Cable Authority (CA) but also started granting the fi rst 
multi-channel cable franchises in November 1983. See VOA (year unknown) for more details.
11 Trevor Smale, Interview with the author. Milton Keynes, 11 April 2012.
12 Bryan Carsberg, Interview with the author. London, 27 March 2012.
13 At this time, the role of Radiocommunications Agency was mostly limited to regulating radio 
broadcasting and to some extent the wireless communications industry, which operated at a very 
small scale.
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was initially allowed to bid for up to a maximum of 1/3rd of the cable franchises14, and 
it could bid for cable franchises only through subsidiary or associate companies (see 
BT, 1992). Again, the restrictions were designed to prevent British Telecom from 
transferring its dominance of the telephony market into the cable market. Similar 
restrictions initially prevented BT from investing in mobile communications except 
through subsidiary or associate companies (see BT, 1993).
2.2. REGULATING THE INDUSTRY IN A SILOED MANNER
In these early years of denationalisation, some particular ways of thinking about the 
communications industries and their regulation can be seen. Notably, there was a 
sense that the communications industry had distinct ‘silos’ which were to be regulated 
separately, and which were not directly competing with each other, namely 
telecommunications, broadcasting and cable. Each of these was its own distinct 
market, and the regulators’ role was partly to shape the market and to maintain its 
integrity (that is, to prevent one market impinging on another). What defi ned the silos 
was an underlying infrastructure, and a technology associated with it. Th e deep 
association of infrastructure with service is seen in the way Mercury was required to 
construct its own core network infrastructure. Regulators were anxious to keep 
British Telecom within its own telecommunications silo, and within that silo to tilt 
the playing fi eld somewhat in Mercury’s favour, for example by requiring British 
Telecom to make its access network available to Mercury, so as to promote a 
competitive market. Th is approach to regulation is consistent with the ‘Coordination 
logic’ outlined earlier. Th e market was not simply left  to itself; instead a number of 
regulatory policies were implemented in the interests of creating a particular 
telecommunications ecosystem, to keep certain commercial interests separate, and to 
confi gure markets in particular ways.
Another function of regulation was price control, and this had particular 
consequences for both British Telecom and its competitors. Th e purpose of price 
control was to ensure that British Telecom did not profi t excessively from its market 
dominance and from its status as a former public monopoly. Price control was also 
intended to ensure that British Telecom did not price its competitors out of market. 
During the early days of duopoly (British Telecom and Mercury) this latter objective 
meant protecting Mercury from predatory pricing by British Telecom in the retail and 
wholesale market segments. To begin with, the regulator had the option of price 
control in a manner similar to that used in the US, where the rate of return achieved 
by AT&T (originally American Telephone & Telegraph) was regulated (Beesley et al, 
1987; Carsberg, 1987). In this method of regulation, although the prices the operators 
could charge the end-users were not restricted, the profi ts the operator could earn 
were regulated. Th us AT&T was required to invest part of its surplus back into the 
14 Bryan Carsberg, Interview with the author. London, 27 March 2012.
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system rather than simply earn unrestricted profi ts on the back of its private monopoly 
(Meek, 2012). In the UK, aft er much debate, the approach for price control was based 
on restricting the revenue the incumbent operator (in this case British Telecom) could 
earn.15 For this purpose, a formula based on Retail Price Index (RPI) was devised. Th e 
incumbent’s prices were to be fi xed at RPI – X, where X was a percentage value that the 
regulator (i.e. Oft el) would periodically visit. Th us, to start with, British Telecom’s 
prices would be fi xed at RPI – 3.5% and subsequently revised to RPI – 7% (Oft el, 
2003a).
Although the RPI – X formula was intended to prevent British Telecom from 
misusing its dominance, it impinged also on British Telecom’s competitors who, in 
order to compete with British Telecom, needed to price their own products relative to 
British Telecom’s prices. Th e result was a squeeze on the margins of British Telecom’s 
competitors (who, in the 1990s, included the cable operators). Th e lower revenues in 
turn aff ected the return on investment that British Telecom’s competitors could 
achieve.
3. 1990s – THE INCREASED EMPHASIS ON NON-
INTERVENTION
During 1991–92, the telephony duopoly of Mercury and BT (as British Telecom was 
now named) was reviewed for the purpose of further opening up the market or 
revising the liberalisation policy (see Pye et. al., 1991 for an analysis of the consultation 
process for the duopoly.) Th e price-control policy was revised to focus only on those 
market segments where BT was deemed to be dominant.16 As a result, a shift  of policy 
was made which enabled regulatory decisions to be based on market conditions rather 
than on the need to circumscribe BT’s power. By the late 1990s, this approach, 
combined with the European Commission Communications Directive of 1999 (as 
part of the 1999 Communications Review i.e. COM(1999)539. See EC, 1999), was 
further consolidated with the introduction of the Signifi cant Market Power (SMP)-
based criterion for market intervention as the following sections examine.
15 Th e policy of price control was based on the recommendations of the 1983 report “Regulation of 
British Telecommunications’ Profi tability” authored by Stephen Littlechild. For a contemporary 
discussion on the comparison of rate of regulation vs. the RPI-X approach, see Beesley et. al. (1987) 
and Carsberg (1987). See Cave (2003), Littlechild (2003), and Stern (2003) for a discussion on the 
policy of price control and its outcomes.
16 At this stage, market dominance was defi ned by whether an operator had a majority ownership of a 
specifi c market segment. Th us BT was considered to be market dominant in retail, wholesale 
telephony and international telephony services since it could potentially misuse its position and 
infl uence the prices charged to end-users and other operators (Oft el, 1998b). By 1994–95, Mercury 
was considered to have enough share of the international telephony traffi  c to similarly impact of end-
user prices (See Oft el, 1995). Th e use of market dominance as a tool to shape policy decisions is 
important if the implementation of signifi cant market power as a criterion is considered in section 3.
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3.1. OPENING UP THE MARKET FOR FURTHER COMPETITION
Cable operators, following the duopoly review referred to above, were allowed to 
bundle telephony with cable broadcasting without having to ask for permission, as 
they had formerly. Th is brought them directly into competition with other telephony 
providers, notably BT, and provided further leverage for the cable operators whose 
bundled telephony and television was, potentially, a very attractive package for end-
users. Telephony services were further opened up to competition by the removal of 
the licensing regime which had formerly required new entrants to the market to 
obtain a licence. Henceforth, any entity with the fi nancial capability could off er 
telephony services in the UK. As a result, competition in the telephony market 
increased signifi cantly, with Oft el estimates indicating that over 200 licensed operators 
existed in the UK market as of 1998, including 5 national carriers, 4 mobile operators, 
and over 60 companies licensed to operate in international facilities (Oft el, 1998a).
During this time, the cable industry, since it did not have market dominance in 
broadcasting (or any other market segments), was largely unregulated. Th e cable 
industry consequently attracted a good deal of investment, which largely went into 
building the cable infrastructure. Investors in the main were US-based telcos and 
cable operators looking to expand into new territories.17 In particular, the US-telcos 
looked to invest in the UK because of the rate-ofreturn regulation they faced in the US.
As with fi xed-line telephony, the wireless communications market was opened to 
further competition from the mid-1990s onwards. With the introduction of Global 
System for Mobile (GSM)-based mobile services, the number of wireless 
communications operators in the UK expanded from two to four. Th e initial duopoly 
of BT and Racal-Vodafone was expanded to include Mercury One-to-One, and 
Orange (Hutchison Microtel) (BT, 1994).
3.2. COMPETITION FROM BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING (BSkyB) 
AND BT’S GLOBAL AMBITIONS
Th e shift  in policy towards a lightening of regulation is seen in other market segments 
also. With the allocation of cable franchises completed, the Cable Authority was 
disbanded and with the Broadcasting Act 1990, Independent Television Commission 
(ITC), was established. (Valuation Offi  ce Agency, year unknown). Th us created, the 
ITC was required “to ensure fair and eff ective competition in the provision of television 
programme services and services connected with them” (ITC, 1997). At the same time, 
a major change to the broadcasting landscape occurred with the merger of the two 
main satellite operators, Sky and British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), to create British 
Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB)18 (see Chippindale et. al., 1991 for a concise history of the 
17 Richard Feasey, Interview with the author. London, 26 April 2012.
18 Malcolm Taylor, Interview with the author. London, 27 March 2012.
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initial competition between Sky and British Satellite Broadcasting, and the events 
leading up to the merger). Th e resulting single satellite operator was able to parlay its 
economies of scale into the successful acquisition of premium broadcasting content in 
the form of fi lms and sports (such as the English Premier League of soccer, to which 
BSkyB gained exclusive rights). Given BSkyB’s dominance of the premium content 
market, the cable industry struggled not only to deliver its original promise of creating 
regional television content but also failed to become fi nancially viable. Starting in the 
mid1990s, extensive consolidation and merging took place in the cable industry. By 
the end of 1990s there were eff ectively only two cable operators remaining in the UK, 
NTL (originally National Transcommunications Limited) and Telewest.
During this period of consolidation in the cable industry and the growing 
dominance of BSkyB in satellite broadcasting, the restrictions on BT regarding 
broadcasting services had also changed. By 1993, BT was permitted to deliver video-
on-demand (VOD) services (BT, 1994), although restrictions on its delivery of 
television content remained until 1999 (BT, 2000). As the last remaining government 
shares in BT were sold in 1994, and BT was listed on the stock market, BT’s business 
ambition became aligned more strongly with that of a private, commercial enterprise. 
With its focus on delivering profi ts and increasing shareholder value, BT began an 
ambitious plan of expansion outside the UK.19 At the same time, throughout this 
period, BT continued to cite regulatory restrictions placed on it vis-à-vis broadcasting 
services as one of the reasons why a deployment of fi bre in the access network was not 
commercially viable. Th e result was underinvestment in BT’s UK infrastructure 
assets20, which played a key part in regulatory decisions such as local-loop unbundling, 
as the following sections discuss.
Taking stock of the period just covered, roughly between the duopoly review of the 
early 1990s and growth of popular demand for high-speed broadband connection 
(which is the topic of the next section), competition developed on several fronts 
through regulatory action. Th e lightening of the regulatory approach during this 
period was closer to the free market ideology which formed the impetus behind the 
utility-denationalisations. Th is reliance on the Market logic is in contrast to the more 
interventionist measures adopted in the 1980s. In eff ect, the walls of the silos were 
being removed. Cable became a competitor in the telephony market, and the telephony 
market itself was opened to further competition by the removal of the licence 
requirement for new entrants. At the same time, earlier policy decisions had 
19 BT undertook an ambitious plan of expanding its operations footprint throughout the 1990s. By the 
end of 1990s, its operational footprint ranged from Western Europe to North America, Africa and 
Asia. By the end of fi nancial year 1998–99, BT had fi xed-fi ne services in eight mainland European 
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (BT, 
1999, p. 46). In addition, in the Asia-Pacifi c region, BT had a presence in Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan and Th ailand, and was involved variously in fi xed, mobile and 
Internet markets (BT, 1999, p. 46).
20 Malcolm Taylor, Interview with the author. London, 27 March 2012.
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repercussions that ran contrary to the new competitive ethos of the increasingly 
liberalised communications market. Th e regional structure of the cable industry left  it 
ill-adapted to the new broadcasting landscape, and so the industry was unable to 
compete eff ectively with either satellite broadcasting or terrestrial television. 
Th e  restrictions on BT, together with its own commercial imperative, led to 
underinvestment in its infrastructure which, although this could not have been 
known at the time, left  the company handicapped when demand for broadband took 
off  in the early years of the new century. Cable too turns out to have been handicapped 
when the broadband market exploded because of its initial regional confi guration.
4. 2000s – THE INTERNET/WEB AND THE 
CONVERGENCE OF THE REGULATORY FUNCTIONS
By 1999, based on the European Commission Communications Directive (i.e. 
COM(1999)539. See EC, 1999), the UK market was completely opened up and any 
remaining restrictions regarding service provision were removed (see Oft el, 1999a for 
a discussion on Oft el’s approach to convergence). Th e result was that the bundling of 
telephony, television and wireless services became possible for a number of operators. 
However, this removal of restrictions on service provision did not mean that the 
industries became unregulated. As part of the Communications Directive, a regulatory 
criterion based on signifi cant market power (SMP) was introduced as a way of ensuring 
the same rules applied for market intervention in all European Union (EU) countries 
(see Bak, 2003 for a discussion on how SMP would infl uence competition in the 
European markets). As adopted by Oft el, the SMP-rule entailed intervention in the 
markets only when an operator or a group of operators had enough market power to 
either harm the interests of a competitive market or the interests of the end-user.21 
Th is criterion represented the introduction of a market-tested means for introducing 
prescriptive measures and was intended to strike a balance between too frequent 
interventions and letting the market stagnate in the absence of strong supervision. 
However, as the events in relation to the fi rst wave of unbundling described below 
reveal, this transparent approach to market interventions did not always result in the 
intended outcome.
In addition to these changes in the diff erent market segments, an important 
development with implications for regulation was the rapid emergence of popular 
demand for access to the Internet. Th is unforeseen change, cutting across telephony, 
wireless telephony and cable, raised the possibility of an accelerated convergence of 
21 As defi ned in section 78 of the Communications Act 2003, “An undertaking shall be deemed to have 
signifi cant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to 
dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength aff ording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers”. See HMSO 
(2003).
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these market segments and consequently had regulatory implications. Th is 
development corresponded at least partly to Dodgson et al.’s Complex-Evolutionary 
logic, which is characterised by disequilibrium and radical uncertainty, in this case 
uncertainty about how this rapidly growing demand could be met by the several 
markets it appeared to straddle, and how regulators should respond in relation to it.
4.1. FOCUS ON BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY
In the UK, the demand for dial-up (or narrowband) Internet/Web connection grew 
rapidly enough22 during the mid-to-late 1990s not only to provoke a regulatory 
response in the form of a consultation “Access to Bandwidth: Delivering Competition 
for the Information Age” (Oft el, 1999b), but also to make improving broadband 
connectivity a matter of governmental policy.23 Th e result was an increased focus on 
delivering higher speed broadband connectivity. Th ese developments, combined with 
the 1999  European Commission Communications Directive to allow bundling of 
services in an unrestricted manner, meant that the regulation of diff erent market 
segments increasingly began to converge.
At the same time, in line with the European Commission Communications 
Directive, the focus of UK regulatory policy shift ed from infrastructure competition 
to service competition. In eff ect, the operators, who until now were encouraged and 
even required to make infrastructure investments, were no longer obligated to do 
so.24 Th e result, as described below, was an increased reliance on BT’s wholesale 
products by other line operators particularly in relation to broadband connectivity, 
which led fi rst Oft el and then its successor, the Offi  ce of Communications (Ofcom), to 
intervene in the markets. Th e expectations of high growth in end-user demand for the 
Internet/Web, and the potential revenue opportunities for the industry, also played a 
part in the projections of how much wireless data would be worth. Th ese expectations 
played into the UK’s 3G spectrum auction which took place in 1999–2000. Th is 
auction raised £22.5 bn for the UK Treasury (National Audit Offi  ce, 2001) (See 
Binmore and Klemperer, 2002 for an inside account of the auction process). However, 
the high cost of spectrum licences combined with absence of handsets which could 
use the high-speed data connectivity meant that in the early stages of the 3G rollout 
the return on investment for the mobile operators was low (Ofcom, 2004).
During this period of growing end-user demand for the Internet and perceived lack 
of investment in broadband infrastructure on the part of BT, Oft el put its weight behind 
22 Th e UK had 8,000,000 users online in 1998. By 2000 this number had nearly doubled to 15,800,000. 
See BBC (2008) for a detailed infographic based on the information derived from the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).
23 Th e stated goal was for the “UK to have the most extensive and competitive broadband market in the 
G7 by 2005” (Oft el, 2001b, p. 3). G7 refers to the group of seven developed nations – US, UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan.
24 John Cluny, Interview with the author. Milton Keynes, 19 April 2012.
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local loop unbundling (LLU), which had been shown in France and Germany to have 
the potential to encourage broadband growth (Oft el, 1998b). In LLU, Other Line 
Operators i.e. OLOs (that is, non-BT operators), were allowed to install their own 
network equipment in exchanges so that traffi  c between exchanges could be carried 
over the OLO’s own core networks. (Th e connection between the exchange and the user 
remained the existing copper ‘local loop’, to which BT was required to yield access if a 
customer signed-up with an OLO). In eff ect, LLU was a way of introducing competition 
at the infrastructure level in the last mile. Oft el believed that through LLU, the newly 
created competitive market would encourage investment in broadband infrastructure, 
and accelerate the deployment of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) broadband technologies. 
As it turned out, the terms on which unbundling was to be allowed in this fi rst round 
of consultations did not prove attractive to OLOs (Oft el, 1998b; Sandbach and Durnell, 
2002), resulting in their opting for wholesale line rental (WLR) solutions, through 
which they re-sold BT’s wholesale broadband products25 (Oft el, 2002; 2003b). As a 
result, unbundling was not adopted to any signifi cant degree at this stage.
By 2003, the regulatory functions for telecommunications, television, wireless, 
and data were consolidated into a single regulatory body named the Offi  ce of 
Communications (Ofcom), an indication that the silos isolating these markets were 
now removed, and that telephony, broadcasting, and data were services that could be 
delivered over a variety of infrastructures. In the meantime, the growth in popular 
Internet/Web use and subsequent rollout of DSL broadband by BT, together with the 
relatively weak position of the cable industry and the slow take up of 3G products, 
meant that broadband provision in the UK was still dominated by BT, either through 
its own retail products or through the re-selling of its wholesale products. Th e result 
was an intervention on part of Ofcom to encourage deployment of next-generation 
broadband technologies.
4.2. CORRECTING THE MARKET DEPENDENCE ON BT’S 
WHOLESALE BROADBAND PRODUCT
By 2004, Ofcom judged that the broadband market was too reliant on BT. Th e result 
was the Strategic Review of Telecommunications (oft en shortened to Telecoms 
Strategic Review i.e. TSR), which had two phases of consultations aimed at speeding 
up deployment of the next generation of broadband technologies (such as Asymmetric 
DSL version 2 i.e. ADSL2) and encouraging investment in broadband infrastructure 
(Ofcom, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). One of the possible outcomes discussed in the TSR 
consultations was that Ofcom would refer BT to the UK’s Competition Commission 
(CC) and recommend a structural separation of BT’s network and retail operations 
25 Wholesale Line Rental (WLR) refers to a scenario where a non-BT operator “rents” a line from BT 
for transmission. As opposed to Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) where the nonBT operator deploys 
their own solution in the last mile, in WLR, the maintenance and ownership of the last mile remains 
with BT. See Oft el (2002, 2003b).
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(Ofcom, 2004b; 2004c). Th us if the structural separation was to take place, BT Group 
would no longer own the UK-wide core and access network it had inherited as a 
former monopoly – a critical part of its signifi cant market power in the UK market. 
However, as part of an agreement with BT, a referral to the Competition Commission 
was not made, and in response BT agreed to a functional separation of its network 
operations from its retail operations. Th us a new division, named Openreach, was 
created in 2006 (see Ofcom, 2006). Although Openreach remained a BT Group 
company, its function was to deliver network operations such as provision, 
maintenance and repair to all operators, including BT Retail, on equal terms. BT’s 
retail division would be given no preference or priority in its dealings with Openreach.
Dodgson et al.  point out that in the disequilibrium and radical uncertainty 
associated with genuine innovation, where neither market logic nor coordination 
logic can be applied, policies tend to be developed pragmatically within the context of 
“evolutionary and complex system realities prevailing in a particular country” (p. 1147). 
Th e response of UK regulators to the growth of demand for Internet/Web access 
shows this pragmatic response through local loop unbundling and functional 
separation of BT’s network and retail operations. Th ese were both attempts to kick-
start fresh entrepreneurial activity in a market where the existing entities appeared 
incapable of meeting rapidly growing demand satisfactorily.
In the wake of the failure of the fi rst round of local lop unbundling, a new and 
more attractive pricing mechanism for local loop unbundling was unveiled, resulting 
in a glut of investment by operators such as Bulldog, Tiscali, TalkTalk, and Easynet 
into the DSL broadband market. Meanwhile, in the cable market, the two remaining 
operators, NTL and Telewest, were consolidated into Virgin Media. Th e result of these 
changes was that by 2007 almost equal shares in the retail market for broadband were 
held by BT, TalkTalk, and Virgin Media.26 Th ere was thus an oligopoly in the retail 
broadband segment and the lowest prices for retail broadband products since the 
introduction of broadband in the early 2000s.27 From this point of view, Ofcom’s 
policy of introducing competition via LLU was successful. However, an important 
outcome of unbundling was the consolidation of DSL as the prime means of broadband 
delivery, as investment in next generation DSL broadband technologies such as 
ADSL2, ADSL2+ was increased. Although investment in fi bre within the core network 
also increased during this period, fi bre-to-the-premises remained (and remains) 
uneconomic or impossible for most UK domestic end-users and small businesses.28
26 In 2009, the market share in the retail broadband segment for BT, Virgin media, TalkTalk and Sky 
was 25.9%, 22.5%, 24.7% and 12.4% respectively (Ofcom, 2009).
27 Th e average monthly cost of DSL for residential and small business end-users in November 2001 was 
£40 (Oft el, 2001a). Th e average monthly cost of DSL for residential and small business end-users in 
September 2003 was £22-£24 (Oft el, 2003c). By 2013, when bundled with landline (excluding line 
rental) the monthly costs were as low as £5.99 depending on speed and data usage (Ofcom, 2013b).
28 Th e Broadband Stakeholder Group (BSG) report on next generation broadband deployment “Pipe 
Dreams” (2006) argues that despite the increase in fi bre investment, the costs of deploying fi bre to 
the end-user premises in the form of Fibre-To-Th e-Home (FTTH) connections are 
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Despite the generally high levels of competitiveness of the UK retail broadband 
market, regulatory concerns remained about the low level of competition in wholesale 
broadband access29 and about the poor provision of broadband to one-third of the UK 
areas (including semi-urban and rural i.e. mostly sparsely populated parts of the UK) 
which are commercially not viable (Ofcom, 2010). Th is poor service in rural areas was 
oft en characterised as a market failure. In order to boost investment and encourage 
competition, Ofcom conducted a consultation in 2010, and another consultation was 
scheduled for completion in September 2013. In 2011, Ofcom revised price caps for BT 
wholesale broadband products in rural areas where BT was the only broadband 
provider with exchanges in order to encourage competition (Ofcom, 2011). Th e intent 
in reviewing the wholesale broadband access market has been to assess signifi cant 
market power based on ownership of exchanges in particular areas, to assess the 
availability of a broadband product from more than one operator, and to pursue 
remedies that will deliver best prices for end-users along with a choice of service 
providers (Ofcom, 2013a). Ofcom’s focus on the wholesale broadband access market 
refl ects a wider emphasis on broadband provision and improving speeds which has 
led the UK government to launch an initiative called “Broadband Delivery UK” 
(BDUK) independently of Ofcom.
Th e Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) initiative is another pragmatic response to a 
lack of entrepreneurial activity. It has been put together “to provide superfast 
broadband to at least 90% of premises in the UK and to provide universal access to 
standard broadband with a speed of at least 2Mbps” (Department for Culture, Media 
& Sport, 2013). On a diff erent front, an ambition to extend the length of optical fi bre 
network and deliver superfast/ultrafast speeds30 is apparent in the consultation 
carried out by the UK’s Lords Select Committee on Superfast broadband in 2012 (see 
House of Lords Select Committee, 2012 for more details). However, given the EU-wide 
restrictions on state subsidy (EC, 2009), the allocation of funds for BDUK has been 
done on the basis of competitive bids. A number of companies such as Fujitsu, Geo, 
and BT have participated, but BT’s capability to deliver economies of scale and know-
how in fi bre deployment has meant that it has won the bids so far. BT’s competitors 
have argued that the BT could potentially gain a fi bre monopoly that would be hard to 
remove, given that, as fi bre gets closer to the end-user’s premises, unbundling becomes 
less practical, creating a potential regulatory issue for Ofcom (House of Commons 
astronomical.  Quoting the Enders Analysis report “Very High Speed Broadband: A Case For 
Intervention”, published in January 2007, BSG suggests that the incremental costs per household are 
around €60 (£45) for ADSL2+, €300 (£250) for Fibre-To-Th e-Cabinet (FTTC), and €1000 (£800) for 
FTTH. Th us the cost of delivering FTTH to even 90% of UK households would be around € 14bn.
29 As defi ned in the “Review of wholesale broadband access markets”, “WBA [Wholesale Broadband 
Access] products off er the opportunity to enter the broadband market without the need to deploy an 
access network … “ (Ofcom, 2013a, p. 7).
30 As broadband speeds have continued to increase the defi nition of what constitutes superfast/
ultrafast broadband continues to change. At the time of writing (late 2013), this is deemed to be 100 
Mbit/s in the UK. See the House of Lords Select Committee (2012).
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Public Accounts Committee, 2013).31 Th us the infrastructure owned by BT once again 
becomes the crucial asset distinguishing BT from other line operators, whose role 
becomes one of largely re-selling BT’s wholesale products. For competitive 
infrastructures one would have to turn to cable and mobile wireless networks. Th e 
BDUK initiative has thus created an unintended consequence of BT consolidating its 
hold over the fi bre infrastructure – a possibility that Ofcom has tried to address in its 
reviews of wholesale broadband access markets.
As the fi nal part of this narrative has shown, from around 1999, following the 
rapid growth of demand for broadband access, there has been an expansion of ‘Market 
logic’, as the barriers between telephony, cable and broadcasting were removed. 
Increasingly companies whose roles were defi ned by their technological infrastructures 
have developed overlapping roles; and infrastructure, although it has remained a 
crucial business asset, has been less deterministic in relation to the services the 
companies have provided. However, this is not to say that ‘Coordination logic’ became 
irrelevant in this period. Th e focus of regulation, though, has tended towards trying 
to create competitive markets for broadband in a context where BT still dominates, or 
where (as in rural areas) BT has a virtual monopoly.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Although the denationalisation of the UK’s telecommunications system (and other 
public utilities) may have had its roots in free market idealism, as this article has 
shown, the reality has largely been one of ‘Coordination logic’ to prevent distortions 
or failures of the market. Coordination logic relies on prescriptive measures not 
only to dictate the behaviour of the market but also to infl uence the nature of 
investment and innovation. It is therefore a form of goal-driven intervention, 
designed to produce particular outcomes, and needs to be understood relative to the 
circumstances of its application. In principle, Coordination logic as applied to the 
newly liberalised UK telecommunications market could have served a range of 
desirable options, depending on what the expectations of market failure were. For 
instance, regulation might have been oriented towards increased investment in the 
legacy infrastructure.
31 Th is issue arises because fi bre cannot be physically unbundled in the same way as copper. Although 
solutions such as wavelength unbundling (Hoernig et al., 2010) are being developed, the deployment 
of fi bre itself can take diff erent forms such as point-to-point (P2P) fi bre, Gigabit Passive Optical 
Network (PON), and Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) + PON. Of these, only WDM + 
PON off ers the option for wavelength unbundling in a practical manner. However, unlike GPON 
solutions (which more than handle today’s enduser requirements and are hence widely used), WDM 
+ PON solutions are not yet viable for mass-market deployments. As a result, open-access 
regulations will have limited relevance until wavelength unbundling becomes possible on a wider 
scale. See the Independent Networks Cooperative Association (2012) report “Beyond Broadband” 
for a concise explanation of diff erent types of fi bre deployments. See Hoernig et al.  (2010) for 
diff erent confi gurations and architectures possible in a fi bre network.
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Th e main objective of regulatory intervention, though, was low prices to consumers, 
an indication perhaps that a pure ‘Market logic’ approach was thought to off er no 
guarantee of low prices in a market dominated by a single supplier. Also, as the fi rst of 
the major utility privatisations, the privatisation of British Telecom needed to off er 
prompt, tangible benefi ts to consumers if the project of utility de-nationalisation was 
to continue to command suffi  cient political support.
Although the intention of denationalisation and regulation was to create a competitive 
telecommunications market (which is not necessarily synonymous with a free market as 
a free market could result in a private monopoly), through the approximately three 
decades covered here the conception of what a competitive telecommunications market 
might consist of was not fi xed. Ideas changed about who was competing with whom, 
what services should be off ered, how the former nationalised provider should act, and at 
what level competition should operate (for example, whether at the level of infrastructure 
or services). At fi rst these shift s of thinking took place in a context of gradually developing 
technologies and customer expectations. Th e Coordination logic that prevailed during 
this time itself was subject to modifi cation. For example, in the fi rst stage of 
denationalisation, the competitive market was to be developed through competing 
telecommunications infrastructures. Mercury Communications had to create its own 
core network, although, lacking its own access network, it depended on BT’s access 
network. Th is equation of the infrastructure with services was also refl ected in the 
setting up of a separate regulatory body for the cable industry. Cable and 
telecommunications were not considered to be in the same competitive market.
However, as the paper has shown, this conception of fundamental diff erence was 
loosened with the provision of telephony by cable companies, and virtually eliminated 
with the arrival of broadband, a technology in which the infrastructure and service 
are not so deterministically related. Th e relatively sudden emergence of a demand for 
broadband connectivity was something the regulators and operators were little 
prepared for and one which exposed shortcomings in the industry in its existing form. 
In particular, lack of suffi  cient investment in both the telecommunications and cable 
infrastructure meant that for several years neither system had a suitable product to 
off er that could attain high market penetration. In the disequilibrium and uncertainty 
associated with the unexpected demand for Internet/Web access, pragmatic 
evolutionary approaches were developed to try to re-shape the environment into one 
that would foster innovative investment. Th is is seen in the creation of Openreach and 
the more attractive unbundling rates for OLOs. Out of this emerged service 
competition over shared infrastructure or multiple infrastructures is seen. End-users 
could choose from among several service providers, many of them re-selling the same 
wholesale product; or endusers could choose between similar services provided over 
distinctly diff erent infrastructures (for example cable and the legacy telephone 
infrastructure). Th e point to stress here is that this form of competitive market only 
became possible through various regulatory strategies which forced BT, as the 
incumbent operator, to make a wholesale product available to other providers. 
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Another regulatory strategy, local loop unbundling, worked by entitling other-line 
operators to assume control of the ‘last mile’ part of the infrastructure if end-users 
chose to use those operators. At the level of the services provided over these various 
infrastructures, however, something closer to Market logic has come to prevail.
Th e policy of fostering competitive markets through regulation depended on 
policy makers interpreting matters which, on the face of it, might not seem to be 
arenas for subjectivity. An instance of this is the way that the regulatory separation of 
cable and telecommunications can be seen to embody a particular ‘reading’ of what 
these technologies stood for.
Telecommunications was understood to be principally for voice and data services, 
and cable for regionally based entertainment in competition with terrestrial television. 
Any form of Coordination logic therefore is likely to require an interpretation of what 
is relevant to an intervention and what it irrelevant. With the passage of time, cable 
and telecommunications have increasingly come to be seen as alternative ways of 
providing the same suite of products: telephony, video and broadband. Th us, even as 
the earlier policy of infrastructure competition abated, a new form of infrastructure 
competition emerged, between the telecommunications network and the cable 
network for broadband provision. A similar scenario is seen emerging as mobile 
telephony mutates into mobile broadband, and enters an arena where it competes with 
the infrastructures of fi xed-line telecommunications and cable.
Th is ‘interpretative’ aspect of regulation is especially signifi cant in relation to the 
role of competition. In the context of British communications industry, regulation has 
structured the market so as to create low prices for end-users, and a reduction of BT’s 
dominance. However, it is debatable whether these policies have best served the long-
term interests of end-users or the industry. As the article has shown, within fi xed-line 
telecommunications since denationalisation, infrastructure investment has increasingly 
been driven by the economics of Return on Investment (ROI), resulting in under-
investment, and in a relatively low penetration of optical fi bre outside the core network. 
And, as the article has also shown, BT’s dominance has, ironically, been enhanced 
through regulatory manoeuvres intended to reduce it. As the outcome of the present 
round of Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) funding for next generation access (NGA) 
shows, there is a possibility of BT achieving a near-monopoly position over the newly 
deployed fi bre infrastructure. Mansell’s (1997) observation that following privatisation 
former monopolies oft en tend to consolidate their position is pertinent here.
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APPENDIX
Details of the interview participants (in alphabetical order)
Name Expertise and affi  liation in the communications industry (at the time of the 
interview) 
A senior Cable &
Wireless employee* 
–  Communications industry veteran with nearly 30 years of experience 
Bryan Carsberg –  Th e fi rst Director-General of Oft el
–  Oversaw the privatisation of BT and the creation of duopoly
–  Instrumental in implementing the RPI – X formula for the price cap on 
BT 
John Cluny –  A veteran of the UK communications industry
–  Regulatory economist with a focus on the cable industry 
Trevor Smale –  A veteran of the UK communications industry
–  Regulatory expert and advisor
–  Lengthy stints in NTL and now Virgin Media 
Malcolm Taylor –  Former Director of regulatory and public policy at Telewest (later Virgin 
Media) 
* Name withheld at the participant’s request.
